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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES H. HUPP, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
-vs-
HONORABLE S. MARK JOHNSON, 
Judge of the Circuit Court, 
State of Utah, Davis County, 
Bountiful Department, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16603 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant petitioned the Second Judicial District 
Court for Davis County for an Extraordinary Writ directing 
respondent to dismiss a criminal complaint charging 
appellant with driving under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953), 
as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge of the Second 
Judicial District Court, heard arguments of counsel on the 
19th day of July, 1979. Judge Palmer ruled that the offenses 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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with which appellant was charged did not constitute a 
single criminal episode, and thus that appellant was 
not entitled to the relief prayed for in the petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the order of 
Judge Palmer dismissing the appellant's petition for 
an Extraordinary Writ. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was arrested on the 5th day of 
January, 1979, at approximately 1:50 a.m., and was 
charged by separate citations with four separate viola-
tions of the Motor Vehicle Code: driving under the influence 
of alcohol, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953), 
as amended (all statutory references are to Utah Code Ann. 
1953 as amended unless otherwise indicated); operating a 
motor vehicle without a valid operator's license, in violatic 
of Section 41-2-2; operating a motor vehicle with an expired 1 
Utah State vehicle registration, in violation of Section 41-> 1 
and operating a motor vehicle without a valid Utah State safe 
inspection sticker, in violation of Section 41-6-158. 
Pursuant to the requirements of Section 
77-11-6, et seq., appellant appeared in the Circuit Court 
of Davis County, Bountiful Department, and pleaded guilty 
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to operating a motor vehicle without a valid Utah operator's 
license, operating a vehicle without a valid Utah safety 
inspection sticker, and operating a vehicle without a 
valid Utah vehicle registration. The court accepted these 
pleas and sentenced appellant thereupon. Appellant at 
that time entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of 
driving under the influence of alcohol and pursuant to 
Section 77-11-9, appellant was subsequently charged by a 
formal complaint with driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 
Trial on this charge was had on May 22, 1979. 
Appellant appeared through counsel and moved the Court 
to dismiss the charge because the prosecution was barred 
by the single criminal episode statutes. The Court denied 
this motion, found appellant guilty of the charge, and 
set a date for sentencing. Appellant then filed a 
verified petition in the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Davis County. The petition was denied 
and appellant appeals from the denial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT'S CONDUCT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A "SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE" 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-1-401 (1953) I AS AMENDED. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The concept of "single criminal episode" is 
defined in Section 76-1-401 as follows: 
In this part unless the context 
requires a different definition, "single 
criminal episode" means all conduct which 
is closely related in time and is incident 
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a 
single criminal objective. 
Respondent concedes that the conduct of appellant giving 
rise to the charges against appellant was "closely 
related in time." However, there was no "single criminal 
objective" on appellant's behalf to which such conduct 
was incident. The case of State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 
(Utah 1977), sheds significant light on the meaning of 
"single criminal objective." In Cornish, the defendant 
was charged with unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and 
with failure to stop at the command of a peace officer. 
This Court stated, in finding that the conduct did not 
constitute a single criminal episode: 
Not only were the two ofenses charged 
separated in time by approximately one full 
day, but they also were separate in objective. 
The objective of the unlawful taking was to 
obtain possession, be it permanent or 
temporary, of another's automobile. It was 
a completed offense at the time the car was 
taken. The objective of the failure to stop 
was to avoid arrest for the traffic violations 
he had just committed and/or to avoid being 
found in a stolen motor vehicle. 
571 P.2d 577, 578. 
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Respondent submits that in the case at bar it makes no 
sense to speak of appellant's "criminal objective" 
which his conduct (i.e., driving) was intended to 
accomplish. The offenses with which appellant was 
charged are all strict liability offenses, which 
require no particular intent or state of mind. If the 
actor commits the forbidden "act" he is guilty under 
the statutes. Such offenses are not aimed at controlling 
"criminal objective," but only at controlling prohibited 
actions. 
In an attempt to bring his case within Section 
76-1-401, appellant argues that his "single criminal 
objective" was "to perform the act of driving a vehicle 
illegally," Appellant's Brief, p. 4. Common experience 
would indicate that even a person who drives a vehicle 
without a valid registration, license, or inspection and 
while under the influence of alcohol does not necessarily 
form a conscious objective to violate the law by so 
driving. Even assuming that one did form this "objective," 
the conduct of becoming intoxicated was not "incident to 
an attempt or an accomplishment" of the objective (i.e., 
driving a vehicle illegally). Appellant's intoxication 
was not a necessary precondition to his driving illegally 
in the sense that kidnapping may be a necessary incident 
-5-
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to the accomplishment of robbery. Thus, appellant's 
conduct did not constitute a single criminal episode 
as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
Appellant's conduct is not the type to which 
the single criminal episode statutes are designed to 
apply. In Model Penal Code § 1.08, Comment (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962), the commentator states: 
Paragraph (b) requires a single 
prosecution for offenses arising out of 
conduct engaged in with a common purpose 
where the offenses are all necessary or 
incidental to the accomplishment of that 
purpose. In many instances one offense is 
a necessary step in the accomplishment of a 
given criminal objective ... Fairly 
frequent are prosecutions for robbery and 
kid.napping where the kidnapping was 
necessary to accomplish the robbery. 
Given this example, appellant's characterization of 
driving illegally as his "single criminal objective" 
is unsound and constitutes merely a strained attempt 
to bring himself under the protection of the statutes. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF APPELLANT'S CONDUCT WAS A 
"SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE," THE PROCEDURE 
FOLLOWED IN THIS CASE DID HOT VIOLATE 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401, ET SEQ. (1953), 
AS AMENDED. 
The operative provisions of the single 
criminal episode statutes are set out in relevant part 
below: 
-6-
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(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in 
a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished 
in different ways under different provisions 
of this code, the act shall be punishable 
under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish 
separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the juris-
diction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information 
or indictment. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted 
for one or more offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution 
for the same or a different offense arising out 
of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an 
offense that was or should have been tried under 
section 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) Resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) Resulted in conviction; or 
(iii)Was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) Was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has 
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated 
and that necessarily required a determina-
tion inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the 
subsequent prosecution. . 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution 
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and 
that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea 
of guilty accepted by the court. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Sections 76-1-402 and 76-1-403, Utah Code Ann., 
(1953), as amended (emphasis added). In the case of State v. 
Sosa, filed July 5, 1979, No. 15929, this Court wrote: 
The single criminal episode 
statute is strictly proceduLal in 
nature. It requires that when a defendant 
is brought before a court, all offenses 
arising from a single incident which 
are triable before that court should be 
charged at the same time. If separate 
charges can be joined, they should be. 
Id. at p. 4. Respondent submits that in the case at bar, 
even if appellant's conduct constitutes a single criminal 
episode under § 76-1-401, the above-stated requirement was 
met and thus the ruling O·f Judge Palmer should be affirmed. 
Under§ 76-1-402(1), if the "same act" of a 
defendant may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions of the Code, defendant may be punished under only 
one such provision. This subsection does not apply to the 
case at bar because the only "act" which is common to each 
offense for which appellant was charged is that of operating 
a motor vehicle. This act alone is not prohibited by any 
section of the code and thus is not punishable in different 
ways. Only if "act" is defined to include, in addition to 
driving, the further acts of being intoxicated, or failing to :I 
a valid driver's license, registration, or vehicle inspectior ... 
does the provision make sense. In this light, it was not 
-8-
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the "same act" of appellant for which he was charged with four 
distinct offenses, but rather four distinct "acts" which 
constitute four distinct offenses. 
Under§ 76-1-402(2), a defendant whose conduct 
establishes separate offenses should not, unless the judge 
otherwise orders, be subject to separate trials. This 
provision does not apply to the instant case because 
appellant was not subjected to "separate trials." The 
procedure for disposition of citation offenses is set out 
in the following sections: 
§ 77-11-6 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking 
a person into custody . . . may issue and 
deliver a citation requiring any person 
subject to arrest or prosecution on a 
misdemeanor charge to appear at the 
court of the magistrate before whom the 
person could be taken pursuant to law if 
the person had been arrested. 
(emphasis added); and: 
(1) Whenever a citation is issued 
pursuant to the provisions of section 
77-11-6, the copy of the citation filed 
with the magistrate may be used in lieu 
of a complaint to which the person cited 
may plead guilty or on which bail may be 
posted and forfeited. 
(2) If the person cited wilfully 
fails to appear before a magistrate 
pursuant to a citation issued under 
section 77-11-6 or pleads not guilty to 
the offense charged . . . a complaint 
-9-
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shall be filed and proceedings 
held in accordance with the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 
§ 77-11-9 (emphasis added) . The procedure set forth above 
was strictly followed in this case. Appellant pleaded guil~ 
to the three violations of driving without a license, 
registration, or vehicle inspection and entered a plea of 
not guilty to the charge of driving under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. A complaint was then filed and a time 
set for the trial of the charge to which appellant pleaded 
not guilty. This procedure did not constitute two "separa~ 
trials," but rather a series of events leading to one trial 
on the driving under the influence charge. To hold otherwise 
would create a conflict between § 77-11-9 and the single 
criminal episode statutes since any time a defendant was 
charged with multiple citation offenses he could plead guil~ 
to one or more offenses and not guilty to the others and avoic / 
I 
subsequent proceedings on those charges to which he pleaded 
not guilty by arguing the statutory bar of § 76-1-402. 
Section 76-1-403(1) bars a subsequent prosecution 
for offenses which were or should have been (under § 76-1-402 
prosecuted in a former prosecution. For the reasons stated 
above, it makes no sense to speak of (1) the accepting of 
guilty pleas on some charges, and ( 2) the trial of other chacc-. 
to which appellant pleaded not guilty, as separate "prosecut~ 
-10-
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The procedure set forth in § 77-11-9, infra, is, when followed, 
only one prosecution leading to one trial. Thus, § 76-1-403 
does not apply here. 
Finally, appellant suggests that the judge should 
not have accepted appellant's pleas of not guilty until after 
the trial on the charge of driving under the influence. The 
danger in this contention is shown by the following illustration. 
Most citation offenses are disposed of by the defendant's 
mailing the appropriate fine directly to the Circuit Court 
Clerk's Office. Such a procedure is equivalent to a plea of 
guilty to the offense charged which is automatically accepted 
by the court. The fine (sentence) is pre-set according to 
the bail schedule. If appellant had chosen to mail the 
fines for the three offenses to which he pleaded guilty and 
then appear to plead not guilty to driving under the influence, 
he would, under the theory he advances here, not be subject 
to prosecution on the latter charge. This result would follow 
even though no judge had accepted appellant's guilty pleas. 
This shows that appellant's argument that his case fits within 
the single criminal episode statutes is unfounded. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the order dismissing 
petitioner's petition for an Extraordinary Writ be affirmed 
for the following reasons. First, where as here, a defendant 
is charged by citation with multiple violations of the Utah 
Code and where each of the offenses is a "strict-liability" 
crime, the single criminal episode statutes do not apply 
because there is no "single criminal episode" as that phrase 
is intended. Second, even if conduct such as appellant's 
constitutes a "single criminal episode," the words "same act" 
under § 76-1-402 must be interpreted to include not merely 
the act of driving, but also the acts or omissions of 
becoming intoxicated, and failing to obtain a valid driver's 
license, registration, or vehicle inspection. Appellant 
committed four separate "acts" punishable in If our different 
ways under the Code. 
Finally, the procedure following in cases such as 
this does not subject a defendant to multiple prosecutions 
for charges which could have been disposed of in one prosecuti~ 
Rather, the acceptance of guilty pleas on some charges and 
subsequent trial on other charges to which the defendant 
pleaded not guilty constitutes one prosecution within the 
mandate of § 76-1-403. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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